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Action information contributes to 
metacognitive decision-making
Martijn e. Wokke1,2,3,6*, Dalila Achoui3,4,5,6 & Axel cleeremans  3,4,5
Metacognitive abilities allow us to adjust ongoing behavior and modify future decisions in the 
absence of external feedback. Although metacognition is critical in many daily life settings, it remains 
unclear what information is actually being monitored and what kind of information is being used 
for metacognitive decisions. In the present study, we investigated whether response information 
connected to perceptual events contribute to metacognitive decision-making. Therefore, we recorded 
EEG signals during a perceptual color discrimination task while participants were asked to provide 
an estimate about the quality of their decision on each trial. Critically, the moment participants 
provided their confidence judgments varied across conditions, thereby changing the amount of action 
information (e.g., response competition or response fluency) available for metacognitive decisions. 
Results from three experiments demonstrate that metacognitive performance improved when first-
order action information was available at the moment metacognitive decisions about the perceptual 
task had to be provided. This behavioral effect was accompanied by enhanced functional connectivity 
(beta phase synchrony) between motor areas and prefrontal regions, exclusively observed during 
metacognitive decision-making. Our findings demonstrate that action information contributes 
to metacognitive decision-making, thereby painting a picture of metacognition as a process that 
integrates sensory evidence and information about our interactions with the world.
The ability to monitor and evaluate the quality of our decision-making is crucial for adept behavior. For instance, 
when driving a car for a long time it is important to have a reliable estimate about the adequacy of one’s driving 
performance to avoid unsafe situations. However, not much is known how our brain constructs such an estimate, 
or what exactly is being monitored and evaluated. In lab settings, perceptual or memory tasks have been fre-
quently used to probe the mechanisms that underpin metacognitive performance1–3. In such studies, first-order 
task performance generally correlates with second-order (metacognitive) decisions, leading to the intuitive 
assumption that metacognitive decisions are largely based on the same information that governs first-order 
decision-making4–6.
In recent years, however, dissociations between objective task performance and subjective ratings, and dis-
sociations between sources of information supporting first- and second-order decisions have been observed7–12. 
Typically, metacognitive decisions are provided after first-order responses, thereby allowing certain sources of 
information to become available during second-order decision-making. Recent findings suggest that metacog-
nition can be supported by ‘embodied’ processes, such as interoception or response information that become 
available for metacognitive decision-making after a first-order decision has been made7,13–16. For instance, manip-
ulation of neural activity via transcranial magnetic stimulation over premotor cortex resulted in altered con-
fidence judgments during a perceptual task8. Critically, stimulation of premotor areas reduced metacognitive 
capacity without changing visual discrimination performance. Further, it has been shown that the order of rating 
confidence (before or after the response) influenced metacognitive performance on an anagram problem-solving 
task17. From a computational perspective, Pasquali and colleagues explored neural network architectures aimed 
at capturing the complex relationships between first-order and second-order (metacognitive) performance in a 
range of different cognitive tasks and suggested that metacognitive judgments are rooted in learned redescrip-
tions of first-order error information rather than in the relevant first-order information itself18. This is broadly 
consistent with Fleming and Daw’s perspective, in which they offered to unify the above observations in a single 
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framework in which confidence operates as a second-order computation about one’s own performance19. In this 
framework, samples of sensory evidence that support first- and second-order decisions are coupled yet distinct. 
Interestingly, their second-order model of confidence computation incorporates knowledge about the reliability 
of actions towards perceptual events.
Here, in three experiments, we aimed to elucidate whether and in what way action information informs 
metacognitive judgments. We therefore constructed a color discrimination task in which we varied the amount of 
available action information (i.e., response strength and fluency of response execution) at the moment a metacog-
nitive judgment had to be provided. Our design enabled us to contrast metacognitive decisions based on purely 
perceptual information (uninformed by action processes) with metacognitive decisions having access to both 
perceptual and motor action information. We recorded electroencephalographic signals to investigate whether 
functional connectivity between motor regions and prefrontal cortex could serve as a mechanism to convey rele-
vant action information (e.g., response competition or response fluency) during metacognitive decision-making.
Previously, beta oscillations have been intimately linked to sensory and motor processing20. Recently, however, 
beta-band power (de)synchronization in motor regions has been shown to provide insight into the dynamics 
underlying perceptual decisions21 and response uncertainty22. Beta oscillations have repeatedly been shown to 
predict first-order decisions22–24, to support maintenance of persistent activity25–27 to mediate long-range commu-
nication, and to play an important role in the preservation and ‘awakening’ of endogenous information28. Here, 
we focused on beta phase synchrony between motor regions and prefrontal cortex9. Specifically, we expected 
both functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) and metacognitive performance to increase when response 
information about first-order decisions would be accessible during metacognitive decision-making.
Figure 1. (a) Task design experiment 1. Participants had to decide whether the majority of randomly moving 
dots were red or green by pressing a left or right key. The key that mapped onto a ‘red’ or ‘green’ answer was 
signaled by a response cue on each trial. Verbal confidence ratings were recorded either at the end of each trial 
(ACT), or directly preceding the first-order response (PRE_ACT), or directly following stimulus presentation 
(PRE_CUE). In this way, in each condition a different amount of first-order action information was available 
at the moment metacognitive decisions were provided. (b) Behavioral results. Participants’ metacognitive 
efficiency decreased when action information was not available, while first-order performance remained 
unaltered. Error bars represent between-subjects standard error of the mean.
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Results
Behavior. To determine whether action processes (i.e., response competition, ‘ease’ of action preparation29) 
contributed to the quality of metacognitive judgments, we varied the amount of first-order action information 
present at the moment metacognitive decisions had to be provided (see Fig. 1a). We constructed three condi-
tions that differed in the moment participants had to provide their metacognitive judgment (see methods). In 
the first condition, participants provided verbal metacognitive judgments after the response cue and after the 
first-order response (ACT condition). In the second condition, metacognitive judgments were provided before 
the first-order response but after the presentation of the response cue (PRE_ACT condition). In the third con-
dition, participants provided metacognitive judgments before presentation of the response cue and execution 
of the first-order response (PRE_CUE condition). We performed three repeated measures ANOVAs (the three 
conditions as levels) on first-order task performance (da), metacognitive sensitivity (meta da) and metacognitive 
efficiency (meta da - da), respectively (see methods). Metacognitive sensitivity quantifies (in units of da) how well 
a participant can discriminate correct from incorrect decisions on a first-order task. Metacognitive efficiency is 
the ability to discriminate between correct and incorrect decisions relative to different levels of first-order task 
performance. Because of the known influence of first-order task performance on metacognitive performance 
(meta da), metacognitive efficiency is a measure of metacognitive performance that is more independent from 
variability in first-order performance30.
We found a significant effect of condition, specifically for metacognitive efficiency (F(2, 28) = 4.04 p = 0.0029, 
η2 = 0.224). For both da (F(2, 28) = 0.631 p = 0.540, η2 = 0.043) and meta da (F(2, 28) = 1.882 p = 0.171, η2 = 0.118) 
no significant effects were observed. Next, we performed (one-tailed) t-tests to find out whether metacognitive 
efficiency decreased when response information was reduced. Results demonstrate that ACT and PRE_CUE sig-
nificantly differed from each other (t(14) = 2.45, p = 0.014, d = 0.663, BF+0 = 4.75), while no significant differences 
were observed between ACT and PRE_ACT (t(14) = 1.65, p = 0.061, d = 0.426, BF+0 = 1.47) and PRE_ACT and 
PRE_CUE (t(14) = 1.45, p = 0.085, d = 0.374, BF+0 = 1.13), see Fig. 1b. These findings suggest that participants’ 
capacity to distinguish accurate from inaccurate decisions improved when first-order response information was 
fully available (the ACT condition) compared to when such information was entirely unavailable (the actual 
response and response preparation). We did not observe differences in the average confidence level between the 
conditions (all ts < 0.753, ps > 0.464).
We aimed to prevent the influence of prolonged evidence accumulation introduced by differences in time 
between stimulus offset and response as much as possible by introducing a blank of 1 second after stimulus pres-
entation in all three conditions31. However, it could still be possible that a longer time window to reflect on the 
perceptual decision could nonetheless influence performance independently of action information. In such a sce-
nario of prolonged evidence accumulation we would expect the da to be higher in the ACT condition compared 
to the PRE_CUE and PRE_ACT conditions since evidence had more time to accumulate. To assess whether our 
experimental design was successful in preventing effects due to prolonged evidence accumulation, we post-hoc 
tested differences between da scores in ACT and PRE_ACT, and in ACT and PRE_CUE respectively (see Fig. 1b). 
We did not observe any significant da differences (ACT vs. PRE_ACT: t(14)=0.56, p = 0.584, BF10 = 0.301; ACT 
vs. PRE_CUE: t(14)=1.00, p = 0.334, BF10 = 0.403). These findings indicate that the presented blank after stimulus 
offset most likely eliminated effects of prolonged evidence accumulation.
EEG results. In order to examine the neural mechanisms that support communication between motor 
areas and prefrontal regions during metacognitive decision-making, we assessed differences in interregional 
Figure 2. Functional connectivity. Functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between motor cortex and 
prefrontal cortex was higher in ACT where response information was available during metacognitive decision-
making compared to PRE_ACT and PRE_CUE. No effects were observed for alpha phase synchrony. Shaded 
areas represent within-subjects standard error of the mean. Time zero refers to the onset of the metacognitive 
question (see Fig. 1).
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functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between the central frontal electrode Fz9(see methods) and 
motor channels C3 or C4 (depending on the hand that responded) in the 500 ms time window preceding partic-
ipants’ metacognitive judgment. There was a significant effect of condition for changes in beta phase synchrony 
(Greenhouse-Geisser corrected: F(1.29,18.19) = 8.434, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.376). Because oscillatory activity in the alpha 
band has also been closely linked to action mechanisms32, we explored whether differences between conditions in 
alpha phase synchrony could be observed. No effects were found for changes in alpha phase synchrony between 
conditions (F(2,28) = 1.483, p = 0.244, η2 = 0.096); see Fig. 2. We found higher functional connectivity (beta phase 
synchrony) in ACT compared to PRE_ACT (t(14) = 3.89, p = 0.002, d = 1.004, BF10 = 25.437) and PRE_CUE 
(t(14) = 2.446, p = 0.028, d = 0.632, BF10 = 2.405). No differences were observed between PRE_ACT and PRE_CUE 
(t(14) = 1.20, p = 0.250, d = 0.310, BF10 = 0.482).
Next, we investigated whether functional connectivity changes (beta phase synchrony) were accompanied by 
changes in beta power in the central frontal channel Fz. Beta power was higher in ACT compared to PRE_ACT 
(t(14) = 2.765, p = 0.015, d = 0.714, BF10 = 3.957), while no differences were found between ACT and PRE_CUE 
(t(14) = 1.364, p = 0.194, d = 0.352, BF10 = 0.011); see Fig. 3a.
Control experiment. In our EEG analyses, we attempted to minimize the effect of the mere presence of 
a motor response (the act of moving your finger) by focusing on the last 500 ms preceding the metacognitive 
judgment (see Fig. 1a). Nonetheless, EEG results observed in the first experiment could still be influenced by 
epiphenomenal/lingering motor activity caused by pressing a button in ACT versus not having pressed a button 
in PRE_ACT and PRE_CUE. We thus repeated the first experiment (ACT and PRE_ACT) while replacing the 
verbal confidence judgment with a verbal report of a random letter (see Fig. 4). In this way, we were able to find 
out whether the observed beta effects (phase synchrony/power) were related to epiphenomenal motor activ-
ity or whether this was instead specifically linked to metacognitive judgments. In the control experiment, no 
differences in first-order performance (da) between the two conditions were observed (t(18) = 0.164, p = 0.872, 
d = 0.038, BF10 = 0.240; Mean da condition 1 = 0.99, SD = 0.45; Mean da condition 2 = 0.97, SD = 0.44). In con-
trast to the first experiment, we did not observe a significant difference in functional connectivity between ACT 
and PRE_ACT (beta phase synchrony: t(18) = 0.475, p = 0.641, d = 0.109, BF10 = 0.263; alpha phase synchrony: 
t(18) = 0.511, p = 0.615, d = 0.117, BF10 = 0.267), see Fig. 5a. Similarly to the first experiment, however, we did 
observe a difference in beta power between ACT and PRE_ACT (t(18) = 5.098, p < 0.001, d = 1.201, BF10 = 311.7), 
see Fig. 3b. These findings indicate that the increase in functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between 
frontal and motor areas is not merely caused by epiphenomenal first-order response activity, but seems instead to 
be connected to the metacognitive processes that follow first-order responses. In contrast, beta power differences 
between the conditions in the current experiments seem to be non-specific to what happens after the first-order 
response: we observed beta power differences when a metacognitive judgment had to be provided as well as when 
a random letter had to be reported.
Experiment 2. To find out if we could replicate the findings from the first experiment and to investigate 
whether the strength of the stimulus-response mapping influenced the strength of the observed behavioral and 
EEG effects, we recorded behavioral data and EEG signals during a second experiment in which we omitted the 
response cue (see Fig. 6a). As such, the experiment was similar to the first experiment with the exceptions that 
the stimulus-response mapping was kept stable across the entire experiment, and that the PRE_CUE condition 
was no longer present.
Behavior. We performed (one-tailed) t-tests to find out whether metacognitive efficiency decreased when 
action information was absent. We replicated findings from the first experiment (though the statistical effect is 
small) and found increased metacognitive efficiency when response information was available (ACT) compared 
to PRE_ACT in which this information was absent (t(18) = 2.134, p = 0.023, d = 0.490, BF+0 = 2.89). No significant 
differences were observed between conditions for da scores (t(18) = 0.713, p = 0.758, d = 0.164, BF+0 = 0.151) or 
Figure 3. Time frequency results of experiment 1 (a), control experiment (b) and experiment 2 (c). In contrast 
to the functional connectivity results, we observed a similar pattern of enhanced beta power in all three 
experiments (including the control experiment), indicating that these beta power effects are unspecific to 
metacognitive decision-making. Time zero refers to the onset of the metacognitive question (see Fig. 1).
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meta da scores (t(18) = 1.622, p = 0.061, d = 0.372, BF+0 = 1.337), see Fig. 6b. In this experiment, we did observe 
a consistent lower level of confidence in ACT (mean = 2.63, SD = 0.433) compared to PRE_ACT (mean = 2.70, 
SD = 0.431), t(18) = 2.999, p = 0.012, d = 0.642, BF10 = 4.17.
Figure 4. Task design control experiment. In the control experiment we replaced the metacognitive decision 
with a verbal response of a letter, while keeping the rest of the design identical to ACT and PRE_ACT of the first 
experiment.
Figure 5. (a) Functional connectivity differences of beta (left) and alpha (right) phase synchrony. Similar 
to Fig. 2, we observed enhanced functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between motor cortex and 
central frontal cortex in ACT where response information was available during metacognitive decision-making 
compared to PRE_ACT. This effect was not observed in the control experiment where participants were not 
engaged in a metacognitive task. In all three experiments, no alpha phase synchrony differences were observed. 
Shaded areas represent within-subjects standard error of the mean. (b) Direct comparisons of the observed 
beta phase synchrony differences in all three experiments show that the effect is specific to settings in which 
metacognitive decisions are required. Error bars represent between-subjects standard error of the mean. Time 
zero refers to the onset of the metacognitive question (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 6. (a) Task design experiment 2. In the second experiment we omitted the response cue, while keeping 
the rest of the design similar to experiment 1. (b) Behavioral results. We replicated our findings from the first 
experiment and observed that metacognitive efficiency decreased when action information was absent, while 
first order performance remained unaffected. Error bars represent between-subjects standard error of the mean.
Figure 7. Combined results. When combining the data from experiment 1 and 2 we find strong evidence for 
increased metacognitive efficiency when action information is available during metacognitive decision-making. 
Similarly, strong evidence is observed for increased functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) between 
motor channels and central frontal regions when action information is available during metacognitive decision-
making.
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Although our design is not well suited to investigate differences in reaction times (due to the 1 s blank that 
preceded each first-order response, see Fig. 6a), we nonetheless tested whether RT differences existed between 
ACT (Mean = 491 ms, SD = 61) and PRE_ACT (Mean = 502 ms, SD = 70) that could accompany the observed 
difference in confidence level between the conditions. We found no differences in RT between both conditions 
(t(18) = 1.970, p = 0.064, d = 0.452, BF10 = 1.163).
EEG results. In the second experiment we repeated the analyses from the first experiment by focusing 
on functional connectivity differences between ACT and PRE_ACT. We replicated our previous findings and 
observed higher functional connectivity (beta phase synchrony) in ACT compared to PRE_ACT (t(15) = 4.038, 
p = 0.001, d = 1.009, BF10 = 36.003; alpha phase synchrony: t(15) = 0.881, p = 0.392, d = 0.22, BF10 = 0.358), see 
Fig. 5a. We also observed higher beta power in ACT compared to PRE_ACT (t(15) = 2.639, p = 0.019, d = 0.660, 
BF10 = 3.269, see Fig. 3c), however, due to a similar beta power effect observed in the control experiment, it is 
highly unlikely that the beta power effects are the result of our experimental manipulation.
General results. In order to determine the overall effect of action processes on metacognitive efficiency, we 
grouped the data from the first and second experiment together (see methods) using Bayesian statistics, which 
make it possible to meaningfully aggregate subjects and/or experiments in a post-hoc manner. We therefore 
grouped PRE_ACT and PRE_CUE from experiment 1 so as to create two conditions, as in experiment 2. We 
observed strong evidence for higher metacognitive efficiency (BF+0 = 19.151, see Fig. 7) when action information 
was available during metacognitive judgments. Note that the combined effect is much stronger than the weak 
behavioral effects observed in each individual study, suggesting the need for large enough sample size. Future 
studies investigating changes in metacognitive performance could benefit from such a larger sample size, and 
from using a longer lasting staircase procedure for second-order performance as well as first-order performance, 
preventing the exclusion of participants.
To test whether functional connectivity differences between ACT and PRE_ACT differed between the exper-
imental and control experiment, we directly compared ACT and PRE_ACT differences with each other33 using 
independent sampled t-tests. In all experiments we subtracted values from PRE_ACT from ACT. Again we aver-
aged PRE_ACT and PRE_CUE from experiment 1 and subtracted that from the ACT condition. We observed sig-
nificantly greater differences in the experimental conditions compared to the control condition (first experiment 
vs. control experiment: t(32) = 2.904, p = 0.007, d = 1.003, BF10 = 6.901; second experiment vs. control experiment: 
t(33) = 4.057, p < 0.001, d = 1.377, BF10 = 87.51), see Fig. 5b. When examining the combined data from the first 
and second experiment with respect to functional connectivity, we find strong evidence for greater beta phase 
synchrony between motor and central frontal regions when action information is available at the moment of 
metacognitive decision-making (BF+0 = 1127.912, see Fig. 7 & 8).
Discussion
Decision-making is typically accompanied by an estimate about the quality of one’s choices, actions or perfor-
mance. Adequate metacognition is not only important in everyday life settings (e.g., whether you can assess 
whether you are still able to drive safely on a long trip, or knowing what you know while studying for an exam), 
but can even be critical in certain situations (e.g., in case of medical decisions, or decisions made by a flight con-
trollers). Despite its importance, it remains unclear how metacognition emerges, and what kind of information is 
used to determine the quality of our decisions.
Here, we investigated whether first-order action information could inform second-order (metacognitive) 
decisions. Specifically, we studied whether reducing available first-order response information at the moment 
second-order decisions had to be provided affected metacognitive performance in a color discrimination task. 
Further, we investigated whether functional connectivity between motor regions and prefrontal cortex could 
be a candidate to convey action information during metacognitive decision-making. Results demonstrate that 
metacognitive efficiency slightly decreased when first-order action information was reduced at the moment 
metacognitive decisions had to be provided. We replicated our findings in a second experiment and showed 
that the effect was small but robust to changes in the experimental design (see Figs. 1b, 6b & 7). Similarly, we 
found converging electrophysiological evidence that functional connectivity between motor areas and prefrontal 
cortex increases during metacognitive decision-making when action information is available (see Fig. 2 & 5). In 
Figure 8. Topoplot of the combined functional connectivity effect (ACT vs. PRE_ACT). For illustration 
purposes we plotted beta phase synchrony differences between ‘seed’ electrode C3/C4 and other electrodes to 
show the spatial distribution of the observed effect.
8Scientific RepoRtS |         (2020) 10:3632  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-60382-y
www.nature.com/scientificreportswww.nature.com/scientificreports/
a control experiment, we demonstrated that this effect was not related to lingering response activity, but in fact 
specific to metacognitive processes following first-order decisions (Fig. 5). Combined analyses of the three experi-
ments provide converging evidence for the contribution of action information in metacognitive decision-making.
Models of metacognitive decision-making. In lab settings, metacognition is typically studied by asking 
participants to make a decision about a stimulus (e.g., the motion direction of a cloud of moving dots, the orien-
tation of a grating), after which they are asked to provide the level of confidence in their decision being correct. 
Previously, it has been shown that manipulating stimulus parameters (evidence strength and evidence reliability) 
affects confidence judgments34 during perceptual decision-making, suggesting similar (sensory) evidence pro-
cessing mechanisms support first- and second-order decision-making. Similarly, in signal-detection-like models, 
the distance of the decision variable from a criterion represents a level of confidence4,6,35,36. The time between 
the decision and presentation of sensory evidence could in such cases result in discrepancies between first- and 
second-order decisions, due to prolonged accumulation of evidence10,37,38. Alternatively, different sources or 
quality of information could contribute to first- and second-order decisions39,40, resulting in different first- and 
second-order performance12. With respect to the latter, we previously demonstrated that sensory evidence con-
tributing to first-order decision-making does not similarly support metacognitive decision-making. Variance in 
first-order performance was driven by different stimulus features compared to variance in metacognitive perfor-
mance. These findings indicated that sensory evidence used for first-order performance differed from informa-
tion used for metacognitive judgments9. Maniscalco and Lau recently compared models describing discrepancies 
between first- and second-order decisions during a visual masking task. They compared models which depict 
first- and second-order decision-making as supported by similar sources of information (single channels mod-
els) with dual channel models, which describe two processing streams giving rise to first- and second-order task 
performance; and hierarchical models, which presume that a late processing stage monitors the state of sensory 
processing. Their results demonstrated that dissociations between first- and second-order performance are best 
captured by hierarchical models. Hierarchical models of metacognition propose that sensory evidence used for 
first-order performance can become susceptible to accrual of noise and signal decay over time and due to further 
processing12. As such, the experimental design itself can be important as the first-order response is typically 
given closer in time to stimulus offset compared to the second-order response. Over time, various factors can 
contribute to a loss in strength of the sensory signal. For instance, further neural processing of the sensory signal 
could result in the accumulation of noise when arriving at the stage at which this information is being used by the 
metacognitive system12,39. Therefore, our design not only manipulated the amount of available “action informa-
tion” but additionally also manipulated the (potential) level of accumulated noise/signal decay. However, in our 
design the effect of signal decay and noise should counter any beneficial effect of action information available at 
a later processing stage: On the one hand additional information becomes available for the metacognitive system 
at a later processing stage, but on the other hand the sensory evidence has most likely become degraded9,12. In 
the current experiments, we observed slight improvements of metacognitive efficiency when the metacognitive 
judgment was made with more time in between stimulus offset and the second-order response. In order to tease 
these different factors apart it would be interesting to combine our previously used experimental design9 with an 
adaptation of the current design in order to investigate signal decay/noise accumulation in combination with the 
contribution of action information.
Another factor that has to be taken into account reflects observations indicating that the level of confidence 
is mainly driven by response-congruent evidence, and appears to be less sensitive to response-incongruent 
evidence41,42. From such a perspective, a confidence judgment made prior to the first-order decision could be 
based on the strength of evidence of each response alternative, whereas a confidence judgment made after to the 
first-order decision would be dominated by response-congruent evidence. In our task, we instructed our partici-
pants to provide a level of confidence of the to-be-made decision, thereby stimulating a commitment to one deci-
sion alternative prior to the second-order decision. However, we did not assess the exact moment of commitment 
to the perceptual decision directly, leaving it an open empirical question how information from different response 
alternatives contributes to confidence judgments when shifting the order within a trial.
Fleming and Daw19 recently put forward a framework in which confidence operates as a second-order compu-
tation about one’s own performance. While first-order models are able to reproduce the above-described relation-
ship of confidence and stimulus parameters, their second-order model accommodates the present findings that 
action information influences metacognitive performance and metacognitive bias. The second-order framework 
predicts that action affects confidence ratings, in the sense that it decreases overall confidence and enhances 
metacognitive performance. In the current experiments we observed this pattern in our behavioral results. In 
two experiments, we demonstrated that metacognitive efficiency increased when first-order action information 
became available for second-order decision-making. In addition, we observed a (somewhat counterintuitive) 
decrease in confidence when metacognitive judgments followed first-order responses in the second experiment, 
as predicted by the second-order model19. We did not observe differences in overall confidence in the first exper-
iment. It could be that trial-by-trial alternations of stimulus-response mappings in the first experiment tampered 
the effect on metacognitive bias shifts. Previously, it was found that participants’ metacognitive bias shifted when 
they learned motor sequences in a blocked design compared to when sequences were interleaved43. These findings 
suggest that the current ease of stimulus-response mappings affected metacognitive bias. In that sense, it would 
be interesting for future experiments to assess whether/how manipulation of ease or the integrity of first-order 
responses influences metacognitive behavior.
Beta oscillations. Beta oscillations are classically linked to sensory and motor processing20,28. During prepa-
ration and execution of movements, beta band activity typically decreases initially, followed by an increase in 
beta power44. For instance, an upcoming action could be reliably predicted several seconds prior to response 
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execution, based on lateralization of beta band activity in motor regions, linking beta band activity to the unfold-
ing of an action21. It has been suggested that beta activity reflects the maintenance of an existing motor set whilst 
weakening processing of new actions45. Interestingly, beta synchronization has been associated with the correct-
ness of an action and has been shown to follow motor errors or after observing the motor errors of others46,47. 
Recently, the importance of beta oscillations has been demonstrated beyond the sensorimotor domain, extending 
to visual perception27,48,49, working memory50, long-term memory51, and decision-making21,24,52. It has been pro-
posed that beta oscillations support long-range neuronal interactions25,53,54, thereby maintaining a current cogni-
tive set, sensorimotor state or the so-called ‘status quo’26. In this way, the up or down regulation of beta depends 
on whether the ‘status quo’ is prioritized over novel incoming signals. Recently, Spitzer and Haegens28 extended 
the role of beta oscillations further, advocating a role of beta in the awakening of a (endogenous) cognitive set, 
depending on current task demands.
In the current study, we found increased phase synchrony in the beta band between motor channels and cen-
tral frontal regions (electrode Fz) specifically when a metacognitive decision followed the first-order response. 
Critically, when task demands changed and a metacognitive judgment was not required, beta phase synchrony 
differences between conditions disappeared. In line with the above-proposed role of beta oscillations, our beta 
phase synchrony findings indicate that task demands (the metacognitive task) resulted in the maintenance of 
first-order action information (e.g., response fluency, response competition strength). It would be interesting to 
investigate what role explicitly asking for a metacognitive judgment has on beta band activity. If we assume that 
decisions are naturally accompanied by an estimate about the quality of an action or choice, it could be that by 
explicitly asking for such an estimate after a short time interval we could have prolonged or boosted a naturally 
occurring more transient event (for a similar discussion in consciousness research55). Indeed, beta phase syn-
chrony effects in the control condition initially seem to mimic those observed in the other two experiments, only 
starting to deflect in the period preceding the metacognitive judgment. It would be interesting to test ‘naturally 
occurring’ metacognitive processes in future experiments, thereby using observed neural markers of explicitly 
probed metacognitive processes9,56–58,.
Motor activity and metacognition. The present results indicate a contribution of first-order motor 
response information in metacognitive decision-making. Previously, Wenke and colleagues29 demonstrated that 
participants were sensitive to conflicting motor activity (response competition) induced by subliminal infor-
mation. In their study the “ease” or “smoothness” of action selection in a visual reaction-time task was manip-
ulated by presenting a subliminal response prime that was congruent to one out of two action possibilities. 
Results demonstrated that action priming influenced the sense of control over action consequences following the 
response. Other work indicates that metacognitive experience of response competition is crucial for triggering 
cognitive adaptation59,60. Further, it has been shown in the memory domain that the experience of motor fluency 
is used as a cue that affects metamemory61,62.
Recently, it has been shown that perceptual decisions were biased by the amount of motor effort it took for 
participants to make the response62. In this study, participants’ decision was biased towards the least effortful 
motor response. These findings demonstrate that the ease to act on a decision might influence the decision itself. 
However, it seems that metacognitive awareness of effort or of task demands is necessary for the development of 
such a decision bias63. In the current experiments, results indicate that participants could be sensitive to response 
competition, the fluency or ease of the first-order response60,64 when computing an estimate about the quality of 
the decision.
Alternatively, motor activity could provide insight into the mechanisms of the unfolding perceptual decision. 
Recent studies demonstrated that evidence accumulation processes ‘echo’ in activity in motor regions21. As such, 
perceptual and cognitive states could be reflected in the motor system65,66 and be used to inform metacognitive 
decisions.
Prefrontal cortex and metacognition. Previous work demonstrated that lesions to prefrontal cortex 
affect metacognitive performance without altering first-order decision-making67,68. Similarly, disrupting pre-
frontal activity via theta burst stimulation has been shown to selectively alter metacognitive performance69–71 
(but see72,73). The detection of erroneous behavior, a key aspect of metacognition5,19, has been strongly linked 
to a rapidly emerging central frontal negativity in the EEG signal (error-related negativity74), thought to reflect 
coordinated theta oscillatory mechanisms75–79. In addition, theta has been implicated in learning, feedback pro-
cessing, and action monitoring77,80–85. Recently, fluctuations in prefrontal theta band activity has been linked to 
fluctuations in metacognitive performance9,57,86. Taken together, these findings suggest that frequent exposure to 
external feedback, learning from one’s correct and incorrect decisions induces a shift in which error detection, 
initially elicited by external feedback (or observing the consequences of our decisions), is shifting towards the use 
of internal simulations of stimulus-response contingencies. This internally processing of the probabilities of our 
actions towards outside events and their most likely outcomes5,87–89 could be used to adapt future behavior. In 
such a way, metacognition could be seen as an internalization of external feedback processing and error monitor-
ing, employing similar neural mechanisms57,90,91.
It has been previously proposed that next to perceptual evidence, inferences about “the state of the decider” 
(i.e., one’s own actions19, and prior or global estimates of performance92,93) are important for metacognitive 
decision-making. In addition, to adequately compute an estimate about the quality of a decision it is necessary 
to know the broader task context or infer “the state of the world” (i.e., value for an action at a certain state of the 
(task) environment) at the moment of the decision94–97. Recently, the orbitofrontal cortex has been linked to infer-
ring such “states of the world” during decision-making95,98. As such, central frontal regions and anterior frontal 
areas could play distinct roles in metacognitive decision-making71. Figure 9 illustrates how sensory, action and 
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interoceptive signals could be integrated in central frontal regions, interacting with anterior prefrontal regions 
providing inferences about the state of the world94,95 and the state of the decider19,93 when computing an estimate 
about the quality of a decision.
Limitations. In the current study, we focused on functional connectivity changes between motor and pre-
frontal regions. However, the current neural measurements (EEG) lack spatial specificity to make strong claims 
about neural sources. It would therefore be necessary to replicate our findings using alternative methods (e.g. 
fMRI) that have a higher spatial resolution.
We used a staircase performance prior to the experimental blocks to determine appropriate task settings. 
Despite our efforts we had to exclude participants based on first- and second-order task performance. In future 
studies it might be useful to use a longer staircase period to eliminate learning effects, and employ a staircase 
procedure for second-order task performance in addition to first-order performance.
Conclusion
Monitoring and evaluation of one’s own performance is crucial for adept behavior. However, how metacognition 
emerges is still hotly debated10,12,19. In a series of three experiments, we demonstrated that manipulations of 
available action information affected metacognitive performance. Concurrent EEG recordings showed that func-
tional connectivity between prefrontal regions and motor areas increased after a first-order response, specifically 
when a metacognitive judgment was required. Together with previous findings9,17,67, our results paint a picture of 
metacognition as a second-order process that integrates sensory and action information.
Materials and Methods
participants. Twenty-five participants (15 females, mean age = 21.1, SD = 4.82) took part in experiment 1, 
twenty-nine participants (18 females, mean age = 22.1, SD = 2.65) in experiment 2, and twenty (13 females, 
mean age = 21.6, SD = 3.87) in the control experiment. Participants received financial compensation for their 
participation in this experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve to 
the purpose of the experiment. All procedures complied with international laws and institutional guidelines and 
were approved by the local Ethics Committee of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, department of Psychology. All 
participants provided their written informed consent prior to the experiment.
task design. A field of 600 green and red moving dots was centrally presented (250*250 pixels) on a Dell 17 
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The monitor was placed at a distance of ~57 cm in front of each participant 
so that the collection of moving dots subtended a visual angle of 6.6°. Crucially, on each trial a majority of the 
600 dots (on average 315.11 dots, SD = 6.76) was either green or red. Participants were instructed to determine 
what color (red or green) was predominant on each trial by pressing a left (~) or right (/) key. The level of diffi-
culty was determined for each participant individually by using a one-up- two-down staircase procedure in steps 
of 0.5% of total number of dots before the start of the experiment. After two consecutive correct responses, the 
difference between the total number of red vs. green dots was reduced by 0.5% (3 dots). During the staircase pro-
cedure, each participant performed a total of three blocks (one block of each condition in experiment 1, and one 
block of each condition in the control and second experiment plus a block randomly picked between condition 
1 and 2) in order to assess the level of difficulty that resulted in a stable level of performance set at 71% correct. 
The stimulus was presented for 800 ms, and at any moment during stimulus presentation a total of 600 dots were 
displayed. Each trial started with a blank screen (jittered between 1000–1500 ms, in steps of 100 ms) on which a 
fixation cross was centrally presented. After stimulus presentation a blank was presented for 1000 ms to avoid the 
influence on prolonged evidence accumulation5,31.
Figure 9. Sensory, interoceptive and action signals are read out in central frontal cortex. Anterior prefrontal 
cortex provides predictions about the “state of the world” and the “state of the decider” when a decision is made. 
Central frontal theta oscillations serve as a mechanism to broadcast the need for control in response to the 
estimate about the quality of the decision.
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Experiment 1. In the first experiment, we created three conditions by varying the amount of available action 
information at the moment a metacognitive decision had to be provided (Fig. 1a). In condition 1, the stimulus 
and blank screen were followed by a response cue (2000 ms), instructing participants whether the left or right 
button corresponded to the answer “green” or “red” (Fig. 1a). The stimulus-response mapping was randomized so 
that in approximately half of all trials the left response button signaled ‘red’ and in approximately the other half of 
the trials it signaled ‘green’. This randomized stimulus-response mapping prevented participants from preparing 
their response immediately after the visual stimulus had appeared and enabled us to disentangle motor prepa-
ration from motor action in both our behavioral and EEG analyses. After the presentation of the response cue, 
participants were asked to indicate whether the majority of the dots were green or red by pressing the correspond-
ing button with their left or right index finger. Next, participants had to provide a metacognitive judgment about 
their decision by indicating their level of confidence in being correct on a labeled scale from 1–4, where 1 indi-
cated being very uncertain and 4 being very certain that their first-order response was correct. Participants were 
encouraged to use the whole range of the scale. Participants verbally reported their confidence rating in order to 
link the manual motor response exclusively to the first-order decision (red-green decision). A microphone regis-
tered all verbal responses using speech recognition software in Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, version 
18.1), allowing automatic recording of verbal responses. To ensure an accurate transcription of the responses, we 
set a threshold level of certainty (0.8). Flagged trials below 0.8 certainty were checked manually and corrected if 
necessary (4% of all trials).
Critically, confidence ratings were given at different points in the trial sequence depending on the condition. 
Typically, confidence ratings are given after the first-order task response (ACT). However, in this experiment 
we manipulated the amount of action information (i.e., response execution, action preparation) available for 
metacognitive decisions by varying the position of metacognitive judgments in a trial. In PRE_ACT, metacog-
nitive judgments had to be provided before the first-order response (after the response cue), while in PRE_CUE 
metacognitive decisions had to be made prior to the first-order response and presentation of the response cue. 
This resulted in two conditions in which action information was minimal (response preparation) or absent at the 
moment the second-order (metacognitive) decision was made.
Control experiment. In the control experiment, we investigated whether observed EEG results were specific 
to metacognitive processes, by studying the non-specific effect of epiphenomenal/lingering motor activity from 
first-order responses. Therefore, we used a similar task design as used in the first experiment. Critically, in the 
control experiment participants were instructed to verbally report one randomly chosen letter out of four pre-
sented letters (‘E, ‘G’, ‘P’, ‘T’), instead of providing a confidence rating. Here, we focused on differences between 
ACT and PRE_ACT, since we did not observe behavioral and functional connectivity differences between PRE_
ACT and PRE_CUE in the first experiment, see Fig. 1b.
Experiment 2. In the second experiment, the response cue was removed in order to establish reliable 
stimulus-response mappings throughout the experiment. The rest of the design was kept similar to that of the 
first experiment (Fig. 1c).
Behavioral analyses. In the present experiment, we aimed to investigate whether we could observe 
changes in metacognitive (second-order) performance depending on experimental condition. We therefore used 
a staircase procedure before starting the experiment (see above) and employed an exclusion criterion of da or 
meta da > 0.5 and <2.0 observed in the ACT condition (metacognitive performance is typically measured after 
first-order responses) in order to avoid floor and ceiling effects. As stated above, the aim of this study was to inves-
tigate fluctuations in metacognitive performance and such floor and ceiling effects would preclude the aim of the 
experimental design. Additionally, by filtering the data we tried to avoid potential issues with respect to the struc-
ture of the data (.e., by having little correct/incorrect trials in the data that are necessary for meta-d’ measures; for 
a recent discussion see72). To illustrate, nine participants that were excluded from the last experiment had a mean 
meta da of −0.02 in the ACT condition. This means that those participants performed the second-order task at 
chance level. One possible explanation could be that the way we recorded the second-order response (an English 
verbal report) was challenging for some of the excluded (native French-speaking) participants, thereby avoiding 
more difficult pronounceable answers.
For analyses, 15 participants were included in the first experiment, 18 in the control experiment and 19 in the 
second experiment. In order to find out whether first-order and metacognitive performance differed we calcu-
lated first-order task sensitivity (because the data was split into three conditions we calculated da35, metacognitive 
sensitivity (meta-da) and metacognitive efficiency (meta da – da30,32), for each condition separately. First-order 
task sensitivity (da) and metacognitive sensitivity (meta-da) are bias-free measures of the ability to distinguish two 
signals from each other and the ability to distinguish between correct and incorrect decisions, respectively (both 
in units of first-order da). Metacognitive efficiency reflects metacognitive sensitivity relative to different levels of 
first-order task performance, which is important because metacognitive sensitivity is known to be influenced by 
first-order task performance30.
We performed three repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) on first- and second-order task per-
formance (da, meta-da, and metacognitive efficiency) with condition as the independent variable. All behavioral 
analyses were performed using JASP (Version 0.8.3.1), Matlab (Matlab 12.1, The MathWorks Inc.), type 2 SDT 
scripts99 and SPSS (IBM SPSS Statistics, 22.0). For the Bayesian analysis in JASP a Cauchy prior distribution cen-
tered around zero was used with an interquartile range of r = 0.707.
EEG measurements and analyses. EEG was recorded and sampled at 1048 Hz using a Biosemi ActiveTwo 
64-channel system, with four additional electrodes for horizontal and vertical eye-movements, each referenced 
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to their counterpart (Biosemi – Amsterdam, The Netherlands). High-pass filtering (0.5 HZ), additional low-pass 
filtering (100 HZ) and a notch filter (50 HZ) were used. Next, we down-sampled to 512 Hz and corrected for 
eye movements on the basis of Independent Component Analysis100. The data was epoched −1.5 s to + 0.5 sec 
preceding confidence judgments. We removed trials containing irregularities due to EMG or other artifacts by 
visually inspecting all trials. To increase spatial specificity and to filter out deep sources we converted the data to 
spline Laplacian signals100,101. We used a sliding window Fourier transform102, window length: 400 ms, step size: 
50 ms, to calculate the time-frequency representations of the EEG power (spectrograms) for each channel and 
each trial. We used a single Hanning taper for the frequency range 3–30 Hz (frequency resolution: 2.5 Hz, bin 
size: 1 Hz27). To examine the way information might be distributed during metacognitive decision-making, we 
assessed measures of interregional functional connectivity in the beta range. In our previous study, we specifically 
observed effects in prefrontal channel Fz related to metacognitive performance9. Therefore, we specifically exam-
ined consistencies of the difference of time–frequency phase values between motor channels (C3/C4, depend-
ing on the hand that responded) and central frontal electrode Fz (Intersite Phase Clustering (ISPC)25,38) in the 
500 ms time period immediately preceding the confidence judgment (see Fig. 1). We used ISPC measurements to 
determine whether reducing the amount of motor information available at the moment of confidence judgments 
changed the level of functional connectivity (i.e., alpha/beta phase synchronisation) between central prefrontal9 
and motor regions. In experiment 2 three participants had to be excluded from further EEG analyses due failed 
EEG recordings.
Power modulations were characterized as the percentage of power change at a given time and frequency bin 
relative to baseline power value for that frequency bin. The baseline was calculated as the mean power across the 
pre-stimulus interval (from −0.3 to 0 s relative to stimulus onset). All signal processing steps were performed 
using Brain Vision Analyzer (BrainProducts) and Matlab (Matlab 12.1, The MathWorks Inc.), X code103 and 
Fieldtrip104.
Significance. Monitoring and control of our decision process is a critical part of every day decision-making. 
When feedback is not available, metacognitive skills enable us to modify current behavior and adapt prospec-
tive decision-making. Here, we investigated what kind information is being used to compute an estimate about 
the quality of our decisions. Results indicate that during perceptual decision-making, information about one’s 
actions towards perceptual events is being used to evaluate the quality of one’s decisions. EEG results indicate 
that functional connectivity between motor regions and prefrontal cortex could serve as a mechanism to convey 
action information during metacognitive decision-making. Considered together, our results demonstrate that 
post-decisional information contributes to metacognition, thereby evaluating not only what one perceives (e.g., 
strength of perceptual evidence) but also how one responds towards perceptual events.
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